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I
1 The development of motorised road transport was one of the most important social changes
of the twentieth century. During the century motor transport transformed everything from
military tactics to industrial production, from patterns of employment and housing to leisure
activities and retailing. Motor transport also transformed the built environment with road
markings, traffic signs, car parks, flyovers and underpasses, road-widening schemes, new
roads and motorways, concreted suburban front-gardens and thousands of miles of paved road.
2 The profound social changes arising from motor transport inevitably affected crime and the
criminal justice system. Motor transport contributed to ‘traditional’ crimes such as robbery,
burglary and smuggling, and the police in turn used motor transport to combat crime. Motor
vehicles themselves became the target of theft, criminal damage and fraud. Additionally, the
high speeds and potentially destructive power of motor vehicles created new problems of
traffic regulation as cars, motor-bikes and lorries multiplied on roads and streets designed for
pedestrians and carts. Throughout the twentieth century the UK Parliament repeatedly passed
new traffic legislation, a huge proportion of police time was spent dealing with motor vehicles
and the courts experienced an enormous increase in the number of road traffic prosecutions.
3 A number of historians have debated the significance of twentieth-century road traffic
legislation and its impact on the criminal justice system. William Plowden’s account of the
development of UK legislation relating to motorised road transport focused on government
motor transport policy at the national level and the role of the various interest groups seeking
to influence it3. Clive Emsley has compared the development of motor traffic regulation with
three models of the criminal law: the whiggish view that laws are created to solve specific
problems; the Marxist view that laws further class interests; and V. A. C. Gatrell’s concept
of the ‘policeman state’ in which the law is used to maintain ‘order’4. Emsley concluded that
road-traffic legislation was not primarily inspired by class interests and that the ‘policeman
state’ model fits the evidence best5. However, Emsley’s interpretation has been challenged by
Sean O’Connell, who has demonstrated the important influence of motorists’ organisations
such as the RAC (Royal Automobile Club) and AA (Automobile Association), and of the
nominally independent National Safety First Association, which he shows was substantially
funded by the motor industry and played an important role in legitimating the high casualty
rates associated with motor vehicles in the eyes of policy-makers and the general public6.
O’Connell argues that government policy and legislation relating to motor traffic were heavily
influenced by the class interests of capitalist manufacturers and the relatively wealthy owners
of private motor cars.
4 While these historians have considered motor traffic legislation mainly from the point of view
of legislators and policy-makers, Howard Taylor has examined traffic regulation from the
operational perspective of the police7. Taylor pointed out that police resources have always
been insufficient to deal with every crime which is committed and that the number of crimes
prosecuted in the courts and thus appearing in the official statistics is controlled by ‘supply-
side’ factors such as police budgets, priorities and politics, rather than by the ‘demand-side’
of actual offending rates8. In respect of traffic offences Taylor has claimed that in the period
following the First World War the police deliberately switched their resources to prosecuting
motoring offences rather than minor public order offences such as drunkenness and that police
authorities manipulated traffic accident statistics in order to justify police staffing levels9.
However, Robert Morris has criticised Taylor for over-stating the extent and character of
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budgetary control on the police and for down-playing the organisation of policing into more
than 100 separate local forces, which in his view rules out conscious manipulation of national
crime figures10. Morris re-emphasises the importance of the rapidly increasing rates of car
ownership and the high death rates from traffic incidents as key factors in the development of
early twentieth-century traffic policing.
5 This article contributes to the debate on the significance of road traffic offending by examining
the impact of the enormous increase in prosecutions for traffic offences on a hitherto neglected
component of the criminal justice system, the magistrates’ courts. A survey of the work of
one central London magistrates’ court is presented which demonstrates the manner in which
a small local court influenced not only which offences were prosecuted but also their final
disposal. This article will first demonstrate that the capacity of the magistrates’ court acted
as an additional ‘supply-side’ constraint on police prosecutions, limiting the total number
of prosecutions which could be pursued. Secondly the way in which individual magistrates
exercised their discretion in dealing with serious traffic cases will be examined. A key finding
of this study is that the penalties imposed at Clerkenwell Court for serious traffic offences
differed significantly from the national averages, and in the final section of this article evidence
for the attitudes of magistrates and court staff towards offending motorists will be examined
to see how far these attitudes explain the magistrates’ discretionary sentencing decisions.
II
6 The first petrol-driven motor vehicles took to the English roads towards the end of the
nineteenth century but until about 1905 they were rare and expensive curiosities. Before 1912
private motor cars were luxury items11. During the inter-war period mass production reduced
prices but cars remained expensive and full ‘democratisation’ of motoring did not occur until
the 1960s12. Nevertheless, the number of private cars in Britain rose from just over 100,000
in 1918 to over two million in 1939, and the 1920s and 1930s can justifiably be viewed as
the beginning of ‘Britain’s first era of mass motoring’13. The UK legislation which governs
motorised road transport was mainly developed during this period. This survey of motoring
offences covers the period from 1913, when the numbers of motorised buses and hire cabs in
London had started to increase but private motor vehicles were still relatively uncommon14, to
1963, when a mass market for cars and utility uses for motor vehicles were well established and
non-motorised vehicles had become a tiny minority on the roads15. This article deals with traffic
offences heard at Clerkenwell Court in central London. A local survey of this kind allows
the details of the impact of the social changes due to increasing motor traffic to be studied
and complements the more general information provided by the national statistics analysed by
other authors such as Plowden, Taylor, Morris and O’Connell.
7 Clerkenwell Court was one of the ‘Police Courts’ established in the central London area
following the Middlesex Justices Act 1792. From the end of the eighteenth century until April
1965 the London Police Courts were staffed by salaried Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrates
rather than by lay justices. This arrangement was unique to central London. Metropolitan
stipendiary magistrates were qualified barristers from the upper social classes and hence came
from a much narrower range of backgrounds than lay magistrates, who by the twentieth
century included not only representatives of the land-owning gentry but also a wide range of
professionals, the clergy, local councillors, successful manufacturers and tradesmen and even
(from 1920) women16. Because of this difference Clerkenwell Court should not necessarily be
considered typical of magistrates’ courts for the country as a whole.
8 Clerkenwell Court was originally located in Hatton Garden but moved to a site on Kings Cross
Road in about 1841 where it remained until it was closed in 199817. Between 1913 and 1963 the
court’s divisional area covered parts of the four Metropolitan boroughs of Holborn, St Pancras,
Finsbury and Islington18. This area had been completely and densely built over by 1870 and
its street pattern has changed very little since that date. It was and remains a street pattern
designed for pedestrians, hand-carts and horse-drawn vehicles, and the advent of motorised
vehicles led to extreme traffic congestion which remains a problem to this day. Clerkenwell
Court’s divisional area included several important main roads, the major passenger and goods
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railway termini at Kings Cross and St Pancras and a substantial industrial zone stretching up
the Fleet valley through Clerkenwell itself and northwards parallel to the main railway lines.
9 Several court Clerks who worked at Clerkenwell during the twentieth century have published
memoirs and these provide a record of how the day-to-day business of the court was organised
between the 1920s and 1970s19. The court sat 6 days per week except for public holidays.
Clerkenwell was a ‘two stipe’ court, with one stipendiary magistrate sitting from Monday
to Wednesday and the other from Thursday to Saturday20. During the summer a staggered
rotation of vacation periods meant that one of the magistrates would work a four-day week
while his colleague was on holiday, with the other two days being covered by magistrates from
other inner London police courts21. Stipendiary magistrates from other courts might also sit at
Clerkenwell if one of the local magistrates was ill.
10 Before 1955 Clerkenwell Court heard 50-60 cases per day on average, giving an annual
caseload of around 17,000. In surveying the work of the court it is therefore necessary
to sample the cases. Other historians researching the work of the lower courts have
encountered the problem of the enormous number of cases and have employed a number of
different sampling methodologies. In his study of Middlesex Quarter Sessions records Robert
Shoemaker used a statistical sampling technique to ensure that his numerical results were
representative22. In her qualitative study of Clerkenwell Court Gillian Tindall surveyed the
court’s work during a single week23. In the present study all the cases have been examined
which came before the court during the month of July in three years: 1913, 1938 and 1963.
These years span a fifty-year period before, between and after the two World Wars but do not
include wartime or major socioeconomic upheavals such as the General Strike. From 1965 lay
magistrates also sat at Clerkenwell and this major change formed a natural termination date
for this survey. The month of July was selected for the samples as a long month of thirty-
one days which includes no public holidays and when the number of traffic cases coming
before the court is unlikely to have been affected by bad weather conditions. The number of
motor vehicles on the road is reported to have been lower during bad winter weather24 and
this may have led to variations in the work of the court at different seasons of the year, but
this factor is outside the scope of this study. The principal sources used in this survey were
the manuscript court registers which are held by the Corporation of London in the London
Metropolitan Archive (LMA)25. Additional material was obtained from memoirs published by
court clerks and stipendiary magistrates who worked at Clerkenwell during the survey period.
11 The LMA collection includes approximately 1900 documents from Clerkenwell Court. The
majority of these are the court registers covering the period 1905 to 1987, which record all
the offences dealt with day by day. The court registers were divided into two parts in separate
volumes. Part 1 contains the offences for which somebody was arrested and charged by the
police. While these include the most serious criminal offences, such as robbery, theft and
sexual assaults, arrests were also commonly made for minor public order offences such as
drunkenness or begging in the street. Part 2 of the registers contains the offences originating
by way of summons. In these cases there was no arrest but a formal complaint was made and
the alleged offender was ‘summoned’ to appear at court. While many offences originating by
way of summons were less serious, the Part 2 registers also contain assaults and high-value
property offences where the complainant was a private individual or a civil authority with no
legal power to make an arrest. Both parts of the register include the defendant’s name, the
offence, the date of the offence, the informant, the plea (guilty or not guilty), the magistrate’s
adjudication and the penalty. Part 1 additionally records the defendant’s age and occupation.
Traffic offences can be found in both parts of the register.
III
12 The first question to be addressed by this study is how Clerkenwell Court handled the growing
numbers of traffic cases during the period. In this section we will examine whether the overall
caseload of the court increased to absorb the new traffic work, whether traffic cases displaced
other types of prosecution and whether traffic cases were grouped together for administrative
convenience, for example on certain days of the week. We will then go on to look at how
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the sentences imposed by the magistrates at Clerkenwell Court for serious traffic offences
compared with the average sentences imposed throughout England and Wales.
13 The total number of cases dealt with by Clerkenwell Court during each sample period is
summarised in Table 1. Between 1913 and 1938 the court’s capacity did not increase. Only one
courtroom was operating, with an average caseload per sitting of 60.9 in July 1913 and 55.3 in
July 1938. However, by 1963 a second courtroom had been opened following the appointment
of a third stipendiary magistrate in 195526. In July 1963 Court 2 sat on 12 of a possible 27
working days, increasing total capacity by 44%. The average caseload of the two courts in
July 1963 was the same within statistical significance: 53.3 for Court 1 and 55.2 for Court 2.
Table 1: Average caseload per sitting for July in each sample year
Year Number of sittings (days) Total cases Average Caseloadper sitting
1913 27 1644 60.9
1938 26 1437 55.3
1963 Court 1 27 1440 53.3
1963 Court 2 12 662 55.2
14 Since the total court capacity did not increase between 1913 and 1938 any increase in traffic
prosecutions during this period must have involved a reduction in other prosecutions. To
examine this, all offences dealt with during the first six working days of the month were
grouped into the five categories used by Shoemaker in his analysis of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century misdemeanor prosecutions, with traffic offences as an additional sixth
category27. Shoemaker’s categories are as follows:
• property offences (e.g. theft, fraud, trespass, criminal damage)
• vice offences (e.g. soliciting, keeping a brothel, indecent assault)
• regulatory offences (e.g. rates, Education Act, trading regulations, employment law,
income tax evasion)
• poor law offences (e.g. bastardy, maintenance arrears, begging, vagrancy)
• offences against the peace (e.g. assault, public order offences, robbery)
15 No difficulty was found in fitting twentieth-century cases into Shoemaker’s categories,
indicating a remarkable continuity in the work of the courts over a two hundred year period.
The results are shown in Table 2, with cases from both 1963 courtrooms combined.
Table 2: Proportions of offence by category
   Propertyoffences Vice offences
Regulatory
offences
‘Poor Law’
offences
Offences
against
the peace
Traffic
offences
1-7 July 1913 8% 3% 22% 7% 52% 8%
1-7 July 1938 19% 1% 12% 12% 15% 41%
1-7 July 1963 10% 1% 2% 9% 21% 57%
16 Table 2 shows a striking increase in the proportion of traffic cases, from 8% in 1913 to
41% in 1938 and 57% in 1963. This is in agreement with the trends in the national crime
statistics discussed by Taylor and by Morris. The main category of offence displaced by
traffic prosecutions was offences against the peace, which fell from 52% in 1913 to 15% in
1938 before increasing again to 21% in 1963. At Clerkenwell this decline was due to fewer
prosecutions for drunkenness or disorderly behaviour, again in accordance with the national
picture identified by Taylor28. However, Table 2 also shows a dramatic decline in regulatory
prosecutions from 22% in 1913, to 12% in 1938 and 2% in 1963, which was not identified
in Taylor’s research on the national statistics. The origin of this decline is not clear. It may
be a genuine effect, perhaps reflecting a peculiarity in the local situation at Clerkenwell, or it
may be partly an artefact of the relatively small samples used in this study. The court registers
show that regulatory offences, such as income tax evasion, tended to be prosecuted in sporadic
batches rather than on a regular basis week after week, and it is possible that the July 1913
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sample may have coincided with a peak in regulatory prosecutions and the July 1963 sample
with a trough. A larger sample is needed to clarify this point, but regulatory offences are
outside the main scope of this study and this point has not been addressed here. Prosecutions
at Clerkenwell for property offences, vice offences and ‘Poor Law’ offences remained at a low
but fluctuating level throughout the period.
17 The replacement of minor public order prosecutions by traffic prosecutions had a direct effect
on the ratio of charges to summonses, as shown in Table 3. In July 1913 cases originating
by arrest and charge comprised 60% of caseload, including large numbers of arrests for
drunkenness. By 1938 the proportion had reversed because most traffic offences originated
by summons. This reversal of the ratio of charges to summonses was sustained in 1963. 96%
of all summonses issued by the Metropolitan Police across the whole of London during 1963
were for offences connected with motor vehicles29. Table 3 shows that during the first week
of July 1963 147 out of a total of 155 summonses to Clerkenwell Court (95%) were for traffic
offences. This excellent agreement with the London-wide average provides good grounds for
considering Clerkenwell Court’s traffic caseload to be typical of the London area.
18 At Clerkenwell charges and remands were listed in the mornings and summonses in the
afternoons30. It follows from this that the Part 1 register would have been used in the morning,
while in the afternoon the court would have finished any Part 1 cases left over from the morning
before starting the cases in the Part 2 register. Apart from this, there is no evidence of the court
attempting to group traffic offences together for administrative convenience in either 1913 or
1938. Similar offences were listed consecutively in the registers but would not necessarily have
been heard in that order. Stanley French, who worked as a court clerk at Clerkenwell during
the 1950s and 60s, notes in his memoirs that remands were entered first in the court register but
were usually dealt with last, while Derek Wainwright, another former court clerk, records how
police officers, probation officers and barristers or solicitors representing defendants would
negotiate with the court for certain cases to be dealt with out of register order. The court did
reserve certain sittings for husband and wife cases (mainly prosecutions for non-payment of
maintenance). These cases were prosecuted not by the police but privately by one of the parties
involved, usually the woman. Regulatory offences were also grouped together because they
were brought by particular prosecutors. For example, a Mr. Seedridge prosecuted long lists of
regulatory offences against the Education Act on three Wednesdays in July 1913.
19 However, the 1963 registers indicate that in the afternoons Court 2 acted essentially as a traffic
court. Table 3 shows Court 2 dealing with the usual unpredictable arrests in the morning Part
1 list, but 95% of the summonses dealt with by this court during the afternoons were for traffic
offences. Since traffic summonses made up 67.4% of all the cases dealt with by Court 2 during
July 1963 it appears that two-thirds of the extra capacity created by the appointment of a third
stipendiary magistrate and the opening of the second courtroom was taken up by road traffic
prosecutions.
20 Traffic offences were invariably prosecuted by the police or, in 1963, a traffic warden or
park-keeper from Regent’s Park. Table 4 summarises the types of traffic offence prosecuted
by summons and by charge. In this table more than 50 different kinds of offence have been
grouped into related categories to assist analysis. Some of the changes shown in Table 4
are clearly related to the replacement of horse-drawn by motor vehicles, some to changing
legislation and some indicate changes in policing. Arrests for cruelty to horses appear only
in the 1913 sample. One prosecution related to a horse-drawn vehicle in July 1938 but none
in July 1963. The effects of changes in legislation are apparent between 1913 and 1938
(introduction of compulsory third-party insurance, driving licenses and pedestrian crossings,
resulting in new offences) and between 1938 and 1963 (introduction of MOT tests and
provisional licenses, again resulting in new offences not seen in the older registers). The 1938
sample shows a peak in prosecutions for speeding and also a large number of prosecutions
of pedal cyclists who held on to moving motor vehicles, which suggests the police may have
been conducting local campaigns against these offences at that time.
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Table 3: Percentages (numbers) of offences in each category originating by charge or
summons
   Propertyoffences Vice offences
Regulatory
offences
‘Poor Law’
offences
Offences
against the
peace
Traffic
offences Totals
   C S C S C S C S C S C S C S
1-7
July
1913
6.2%
(23)
1.9%
(7)
2.4%
(9)
0.3%
(1)
1.3%
(5)
20.7%
(77)
1.3%
(5)
5.4%
(20)
43.3%
(161)
9.1%
(34)
5.4%
(20)
2.1%
(8)
60.5%
(225)
39.5%
(147)
1-7
July
1938
13.7%
(50)
5.5%
(20)
0.5%
(2)
0.5%
(2)
2.2%
(8)
9.3%
(34)
1.9%
(7)
10.4%
(38)
12.3%
(45)
3.0%
(11)
3.3%
(12)
37.3%
(136)
34.0%
(124)
66.0%
(241)
1-7
July
1963
Ct1
12.2%
(30)
0.4%
(1)
0.8%
(2)
0%
(0)
2.8%
(7)
0.8%
(2)
1.2%
(3)
15.4%
(38)
20.3%
(50)
3.7%
(9)
9.7%
(24)
45.1%
(111)
34.6%
(85)
65.4%
(161)
1-7
July
1963
Ct2
7.8%
(17)
0%
(0)
0.9%
(2)
0%
(0)
0.5%
(1)
0%
(0)
0%
(0)
2.3%
(5)
19.7%
(43)
1.4%
(3)
1.8%
(4)
67.4%
(147)
28.9%
(63)
71.1%
(155)
C= Charge
S = Summons
21 For traffic offences the ratio of arrests to summonses was very low. The only offence for which
drivers were invariably arrested was drink-drive. In 1913 and 1938 these arrests included
drivers of horse-drawn vehicles while in 1938 and 1963 they included pedal cyclists. The four
occurrences of the very serious charge of reckless driving recorded in Table 4 for July 1938 all
relate to one case in which the defendant was bailed to return weekly to the court and therefore
appeared four times during the sample period.
22 Table 4 includes arrests in 1938 and 1963 for document offences. However, these offences
were all associated with the serious charge of stealing the vehicle in question. By 1938 the
police had established a policy of bringing several charges against the same driver, so that
if they failed to convict on the most serious charge they might still convict on the others. In
the July 1938 and July 1963 registers every charge of dangerous driving was backed up by
a charge of careless driving and usually a third charge relating to the circumstances, such as
failing to obey a traffic signal. This pattern of invariably bringing multiple charges against a
single defendant was unique to traffic offending; the police only occasionally brought more
than one charge against defendants in non-traffic cases.
Table 4: Numbers of traffic offences grouped by type
   July 1913       July 1938       July 1963      
Offence(s)
Number
of
summonses
Number
of charges Total
Number
of
summonses
Number
of charges Total
Number
of
summonses
Number
of charges Total
Cruelty to
horse 0 18 18                  
Ride cycle
and take
hold of
moving
vehicle
         40    40         
Drink-
drive    9 9    4 4    13 13
Reckless
driving             4 4         
Dangerous
driving 9    9 9    9 57    57
Careless
driving          26    26 78    78
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Inconsiderate /
negligent
driving
         7    7 15    15
Fail to
stop /
report
accident
         9    9 34    34
Speeding 1    1 120    120 40    40
Traffic
signal/
sign
         126    126 152    152
Pedestrian
crossing          37    37 49    49
Obstruction
(Parking) 5    5 203    203 411    411
Condition
of vehicle 7    7 19    19 58    58
Drive
while
disqualified
            2 2 2 1 3
No
insurance          9 9 18 27 11 38
Provisional
licence                   74    74
No MOT
certificate                   7    7
Other
document
offences
5    5 20 11 31 48 3 51
Application
to the
court to
remove
disqualification
                  8    8
Other 2    2 3 8 11 4    4
Totals 29 27 56 628 38 666 1064 28 1092
23 Offences originating by summons ranged from the serious (dangerous driving) to the trivial
(staying too long on a parking meter). Parking prosecutions were virtually unknown in 1913
but comprise the largest category in 1938 and 1963. The 411 parking offences prosecuted
in July 1963 would have accounted for approximately 8 days of courtroom time, which
represents two-thirds of the extra capacity created by opening the second courtroom. These 411
parking summonses comprise 39% of the total traffic summonses for the month, suggesting
that Clerkenwell Court heard a higher proportion of summonses for parking offences than the
London average of 26.6% for 196331. This is probably a reflection of the high traffic density
and narrow streets of the inner-city area served by the court which would have made illegal
parking particularly problematic for the local police whose aim was to keep traffic moving.
24 Having considered the proportions and nature of the traffic offences in the court’s caseload,
in the final part of this section we now turn to the sentences imposed for traffic offences by
the stipendiary magistrates. Plowden gives information on the national average fine imposed
for three serious traffic offences: dangerous driving, careless driving and speeding32. Table
5 compares these with the average sentences imposed at Clerkenwell Court during the three
sample periods. Compared with the national average the magistrates at Clerkenwell were
extremely lenient. In July 1938 eight out of a total of nine prosecutions for dangerous driving
(89%) were dismissed and the defendant sentenced for careless driving. The average fine
imposed for careless driving was only £1.6, compared with a national average of £2.1. For
comparison, in the same month four men were sentenced at Clerkenwell for loitering in the
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street for the purpose of betting. Two were fined £5 and two were bound over on two securities
of £20 each or 2 months imprisonment.
Table 5: Average Fines for Motoring Offences
   1904/5 1913 1938 1963
Dangerous Driving            
Statutory maximum
(£) 20 20 50 100
National average (£) 3.8 Not known 4.9 17.0
Clerkenwell Average
(July only) (£) Not known 1.5 0.0 11.2
Careless Driving            
Statutory maximum
(£) Not applicable Not applicable 20 100
National average (£) Not applicable Not applicable 2.1 8.7
Clerkenwell Average
(July only) (£) Not applicable Not applicable 1.6 5.1
Speeding            
Statutory maximum
(£) 10 10 20 50
National average (£) 3.7 Not known 1.3 4.7
Clerkenwell Average
(July only) (£) Not known 0.3 1.1 2.9
25 The only dangerous driving allegation in July 1938 which was not dismissed was that of an
individual named Gabriel Eyre. On his first appearance Eyre’s case was adjourned. When Eyre
returned to court he faced an additional charge ‘that he did recklessly drive and unlawfully
cause grievous bodily harm to John Faulkner, whereby he died’. Eyre pleaded not guilty,
elected jury trial and was remanded on weekly bail on a £20 surety pending committal to
quarter sessions.
26 In July 1963 Clerkenwell magistrates were treating dangerous driving only slightly more
seriously than in July 1938. Nobody was reported killed, but 43 out of 57 cases (75%) were
dismissed and only five offenders were disqualified. The fines imposed were still much lower
than the national averages and nowhere near the full extent of the magistrates’ statutory
powers. Only one traffic case in July 1963 was deemed worthy of the criminal penalty
of imprisonment. An individual named Kyriacos Nicolau was convicted of driving while
disqualified and sentenced to 3 months. Imprisonment for this offence had been compulsory
under the Road Traffic Act 1930 but this had recently been changed by the Road Traffic Act
1962 so this custodial sentence was at the magistrate’s discretion33.
27 To conclude this section, the picture provided by the Clerkenwell Court registers shows that
during the period between 1913 and 1963 road traffic offences impacted very significantly on
the day to day work of the magistrates court, absorbing a growing proportion of the court’s
resources and completely reversing the ratio of charges to summonses. However, the relatively
low penalties imposed by the stipendiary magistrates and the very high percentage of cases
dismissed might suggest that the courts did not regard traffic offending as serious. The court
registers cannot provide any information on magistrates’ motivation in sentencing. In the
following section this issue is explored using other sources particularly published memoirs, for
information on the court staff’s attitudes to road traffic offences and offenders. These sources
support the view that Clerkenwell magistrates viewed traffic offences as ‘regulatory’ offences
and used their discretionary powers to sentence accordingly.
IV
28 Almost everyone who worked in the magistrates’ courts agreed that road traffic prosecutions
were generally routine, simple and boring. The following quotation from Stanley French’s
memoirs is typical of the views expressed in their memoirs by former Clerkenwell Court
clerks:
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No one likes motoring cases. They are usually very boring; the defendants are far too respectable
to be interesting. Evidence is tedious, advocacy prolix. In many careless and dangerous driving
cases the task of the court, as Lord Chief Justice Hewart said, is to decide “how two cars stationary
on opposite sides of the road came into collision with one another”. This is not an enviable task34.
29 Some stipendiary magistrates felt that their skills as qualified and experienced barristers were
wasted on the long lists of petty motoring offences and that these would have been better dealt
with by lay justices35. Traffic cases were regarded as so straightforward that they were used
as on-the-job training for newly-appointed clerks36. However, it must be recognised that road
traffic offences were by no means the only kind of offence which the court staff regarded
as dull and routine. For example, F. T. Giles found dealing with twenty to thirty thousand
income tax defaulters every year ‘mechanical and boring in the extreme’37. Three factors can
be identified which shaped the attitudes of court clerks and magistrates to road traffic offences:
the social class of the offenders, the time taken by the cases and the sheer number of trivial
cases which were prosecuted. Each of these factors will now be considered in turn.
30 Emsley has pointed out that the development of road traffic legislation during the early years
of the twentieth century represents the first time that the ruling élite used the criminal law to
regulate the leisure activities of its own class. Until the 1960s ownership of a car was largely
confined to the professional and business classes38. Although O’Connell has demonstrated that
this picture must be modified to some extent by the existence of a market in second-hand cars
and by the growing number of drivers of goods vehicles, before the mid-1960s motorists were
still overwhelmingly upper- or middle-class39. This situation is reflected in the Clerkenwell
Court registers for 1963 which specify whether each offender was driving a private or
commercial vehicle. In spite of the industrial and commercial nature of the court’s divisional
area, with its high volume of goods traffic, in July 1963 commercial drivers accounted for
only 18% of all traffic offences prosecuted. For the courts this had an important disadvantage:
upper- or middle-class motorists furiously resented regulation and, unlike the vast majority of
people brought before the magistrates’ courts, they tended to plead not guilty and argue their
cases. In doing so they were often represented by a lawyer, instructed either by themselves
or by the Automobile Association or R.A.C. which provided legal representation in motoring
cases for their members40. Before the introduction of legal aid in 1934 very few defendants
were represented in the lower courts41. The appearance of barristers in motoring cases, rather
than solicitors, was particularly unwelcome. Court staff resented the condescending attitude
displayed by barristers who considered themselves to be ‘slumming’ and also disliked their
attempts to get their clients’ cases dismissed on the basis of tricky legal arguments when the
facts of the case were clear42. The Police Courts prided themselves on being business-like,
down-to-earth and in touch with the daily concerns of ordinary people, particularly in their
matrimonial and regulatory work. The resulting clash of cultures is illustrated by the following
extract from Giles’ memoirs:
Another time [Mr Francis] was trying a motorist charged with driving whilst under the influence
of drink. Being well-to-do, he had instructed King’s Counsel. This great man invaded our
unassuming precincts with the small band of retainers who always trail eminent lawyers round the
Courts bearing with them impressive bundles of law books. These, placed prominently in front
of the leader and his junior, are intended to soften up the resistance of the bench to the oncoming
forensic attack.
However, though counsel wrestled with Mr Francis as tenaciously as did Jacob with the angel, he
could make no impression. “But he ran into a post,” His Worship kept repeating… This was the
one point eminent counsel could not meet43.
31 A second reason why contested traffic cases were deeply unpopular with court staff was the
amount of time they took up. The essence of summary justice was speed. In his memoirs Giles
compared the stipendiary magistrate to a circular saw, slicing through cases at high speed and
‘getting through the drunks with the customary peremptoriness of two a minute’44. Stipendiary
magistrates sometimes over-did this ‘peremptoriness’, for example Derek Wainwright wrote
of Edward Robey, one of the Clerkenwell stipendiary magistrates, that ‘On the bench his
most marked characteristic was his rush to judgement to get off the bench in the shortest
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time possible’45 and Robey himself was proud of having ‘polished off’ sixty-six drunks in
a few minutes46. However, the clerks generally welcomed swift decision-making since most
magistrates would continue sitting until all the cases in the day’s list had been dealt with. The
presence of an advocate lengthened proceedings considerably and made it difficult for the
court to get through all the cases in the available time47. Robey records in his own memoirs
that on one occasion he came into the courtroom to find no barristers or solicitors present and
Giles, who was clerking, remarked, ‘Seeing that there are none of your learned profession to
assist you we ought to get on very nicely’48.
32 During the 1930s, with the support of the A.A. and the R.A.C., the memoirs suggest that
motorists were making ‘state trials’ out of prosecutions for even minor traffic offences49. It
appears that the time taken by defence advocacy was a key factor contributing to the dismissal
of dangerous driving charges. Giles explains as follows:
Of an afternoon we usually had a list of six or seven ‘Dangerous Drivings’. A contested
‘Dangerous Driving’ can easily last an hour but very often counsel would suggest that his client
would be prepared to plead guilty to the minor charge of ‘Careless Driving’ and so avoid the risk
of conviction for the much more serious offence of ‘Dangerous Driving’. Mr Davis was always
chary of accepting these invitations and if, on a short recital of the facts, he thought the case ought
to be dealt with as ‘Dangerous Driving’, he insisted on dealing with it as ‘Dangerous Driving’ and
let the clock do its worst … Mr Davis often kept us in till five50.
33 Giles is clearly implying that Mr Davis was unusual and that other magistrates would generally
have accepted counsel’s invitation. The court registers show that although Mr Davis was
one of the Clerkenwell stipendiaries in 1963 he did not sit during the sample period chosen
for this study. The four magistrates who sat at Clerkenwell during July 1963 were Lance E.
Barker, Frank Powell, W. H. Hughes and J. Denis Purcell, but the majority of the dangerous
driving cases came before either Mr Powell or Mr Purcell. The outcomes of these cases
are summarised in Table 6, which indicates a striking difference in practice between these
two magistrates. In Powell’s court 89% of dangerous driving allegations were dismissed, not
proceeded with or adjourned sine die and only one motorist who contested the charge was
found guilty and sentenced. In Purcell’s court only 50% of the allegations were dismissed
and 35% of defendants were found guilty after a trial. Possibly Powell, like Robey, felt under
pressure of time while Purcell was prepared to sit for as long as was necessary, but another
possible explanation is suggested by the memoirs of Claud Mullins. Mullins was a stipendiary
magistrate at the North London court who occasionally sat at Clerkenwell during vacation
periods. He was unpopular with the motoring organisations because he had the reputation
of being severe with road traffic offenders and applied the law strictly in cases of careless
driving. In spite of this severity he was reluctant to convict on dangerous driving charges
because ‘it necessarily involved the question of suspending the driver’s licence for a long
period’51. By 1963 disqualification was discretionary in dangerous driving cases. Of the twelve
drivers in Table 6 who were sentenced only five (two motor-cyclists and three car drivers)
were disqualified and none of the four convicted goods vehicle drivers lost his licence.
Table 6: Outcome of Dangerous Driving Cases in July 1963
Stipendiary
magistrate Frank Powell J. Denis Purcell Lance E. Barker W. H. Hughes
Sentenced following
guilty plea 1 2 0 0
Sentenced following
not-guilty plea 1 7 0 1
Adjourned to another
hearing date 1 1 0 0
Dismissed, not
proceeded with or
adjourned sine die
25 10 5 3
Totals 28 20 5 4
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34 The third factor influencing the attitudes of magistrates and court staff to road traffic offences
was the sheer number of prosecutions. French notes in his memoirs that over time drivers
gradually came to accept regulation and the number of contested cases and the time taken
per case both decreased. This tendency would have been furthered by the development of
case law relating to the new offences, reducing the scope for advocates to mount a ‘state
trial’. However, these gains were outweighed from the point of view of the court by the
increasing number of prosecutions. The number of motor vehicles on the road was increasing
and proliferating legislation relating to motor transport created an enormous number of new
offences relating to insurance, provisional licences and the construction and maintenance of the
vehicles52. It has already been noted that at Clerkenwell two-thirds of the extra capacity created
by the appointment of a third stipendiary magistrate was immediately absorbed by traffic
prosecutions and that afternoons in Court 2 were virtually dedicated to traffic summonses,
many for trivial parking offences where defendants pleaded guilty in writing and did not attend
court. It is not surprising that magistrates and court staff found doing this work day after day
desperately dull.
V
35 Shoemaker concluded from the results of his investigation of seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century Quarter Session records that the number of minor offence prosecutions was determined
by ‘prosecutorial initiative’ rather than by offending rates53. This was particularly true of
‘victimless’ regulatory crimes, where prosecutions might result from a campaign against a
particular offence54. Taylor extended this argument, suggesting that recorded offending rates
are a construct of policing policies, although he has been criticised for over-stating the case55.
The results of this survey tend to support both Shoemaker and Taylor’s conclusions. Table
1 demonstrates that court time was a finite and fixed resource. In England and Wales every
criminal prosecution must be brought to the local magistrates’ court serving the area where
the alleged crime occurred. Although the London Metropolitan Police could have brought
prosecutions before the local lay justices they never took this route, always choosing to
prosecute in the police court in the areas where one was established, so that between 1792
and 1965 the lay justices of inner London undertook virtually no criminal work56. Table 1
therefore represents the total court resource used by the Metropolitan Police in the Clerkenwell
divisional area, and Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the police choosing to use this resource differently
at different times. Table 4 also shows the effect of prosecution campaigns, for example a
campaign in 1938 against cyclists holding onto moving vehicles.
36 Court records thus provide indirect information on policing priorities. In the Clerkenwell
division these priorities changed with the development of motor traffic. In July 1913 the
police were only prosecuting a small number of traffic offences. Although Metropolitan police
notebooks indicate that traffic regulation occupied a substantial proportion of police time,
and contemporary photographs indicate obstruction by horse-drawn traffic could be severe,
relatively few cases were brought to court57. By contrast, in July 1938 and July 1963 traffic
offences formed 41% and 57% respectively of Clerkenwell Court’s caseload and the largest
group of prosecutions related to parking. While Emsley has argued that the police viewed the
day-to-day regulation of motor traffic on the streets as a natural extension of their existing
role in the regulation of horse-drawn and foot traffic, Taylor has argued that the change in
their prosecution policy was led by budgetary considerations58. This survey cannot provide
information on the motivation of the police, but does provide information on how the court
personnel perceived their own role in the regulation of motor traffic.
37 It is clear from this survey that Clerkenwell’s stipendiary magistrates did not regard traffic
offences as intrinsically serious. In 1938 the magistrates were dismissing allegations of
dangerous driving, possibly because of time pressure or possibly because of reluctance to
disqualify people from driving. In 1963 they convicted in a minority of dangerous driving
cases but imposed penalties considerably less than the national average. The fines imposed
for careless driving and speeding at Clerkenwell were also lower than the national averages.
During the early years of the twentieth century magistrates were criticised generally for
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imposing low penalties for motor traffic offences59. Several historians have attributed this to
class prejudice, noting that motorists were generally middle-class, educated and articulate and
did not fit the stereotype of a ‘criminal’ as a working-class outsider60. However, as noted
above, the Clerkenwell magistrates disqualified five out of twelve drivers sentenced dangerous
driving in July 1963 but none of the four convicted goods drivers. Far from suggesting class
bias, this indicates reluctance on the part of the magistrates to take away working-class drivers’
means of earning a living. In response to criticisms of ‘light’ sentencing G. S. Wilkinson, a
court clerk in Cambridgeshire with a special interest in road traffic cases, pointed out that fines
imposed for motoring offences were often higher than those imposed for felonies and crimes
of violence61. From their memoirs it appears that the Clerkenwell magistrates and their clerks
were in no doubt that traffic offences were crimes, that offending drivers were criminals and
that their court was an appropriate forum to deal with them, but they nonetheless did not view
traffic offending as ‘serious crime’. For example, French wrote
Motorists are now the largest criminal class and in England and Wales there are three convictions
for motoring offences for every two of other kinds of crime. In the Metropolitan courts this has
imposed a very heavy burden indeed on magistrates and staff and has made it difficult for them
to cope with the constantly expanding lists of serious crime62.
38 Here French is drawing a distinction between ‘serious crime’, which from the court’s point of
view originated in an arrest by the police and was dealt with in the morning list, and regulatory
offences which originated by way of summons and were dealt with in the afternoons. He notes
that ‘Often it was impossible to complete the morning list …. so that unheard summonses for
motoring offences piled up alarmingly’63. Clearly the court was prioritizing its own resources to
deal with ‘serious crime’ at the expense of timely hearings of ‘regulatory’ traffic prosecutions.
39 Magistrates had a long history of dealing with offences which while technically criminal
they viewed as essentially regulatory. Shoemaker notes that in eighteenth-century Middlesex,
‘On the whole, plaintiffs and justices of the peace were far less interested in obtaining
formal convictions and punishments than they were in stopping the defendant’s offensive
behaviour’64. Similarly, Tindall remarks that nineteenth-century Hampstead justices ‘were
busy not so much conducting trials as «keeping the peace» in a much more general sense,
arbitrating in domestic wrangles, trying to ensure that everyone behaved more or less within
acceptable limits and making sure the ratepayers’ money was not squandered’65. Jennifer Davis
has noted that nineteenth-century London stipendiary magistrates resisted criminalisation of
costermongers, prostitutes and parents who failed to send their children to school because they
did not regard the offending behaviour of these groups as ‘real’ crimes66.
40 Similarly, twentieth century magistrates saw their role in traffic prosecutions primarily as
a means of ensuring that everyone behaved acceptably, rather than punishing ‘real’ crime.
Magistrates viewed road traffic legislation as deterring inappropriate behaviour and their
primary purpose in sentencing was deterrence rather than punishment. This interpretation is
supported by the court’s response to traffic cases with serious consequences, such as Eyre’s.
If the victim of this incident had not died the dangerous driving charge would undoubtedly
have been dismissed and Eyre would have been fined for careless driving. Only its tragic
consequences turned this offence into a ‘real’ crime to be tried before a judge and jury. Nicolau
was sentenced to imprisonment for driving while disqualified although there is no record of
him hurting anyone. Nicolau had treated the law with contempt by ignoring a court order, and
in the eyes of the magistrate this was a greater crime than any mere traffic offence.
41 The primary role of traffic legislation as a deterrent to unacceptable behaviour was openly
acknowledged in magistrates’ courts throughout the period covered by this study and beyond.
For example, in 1976 the Justice of the Peace commented on a report recommending extending
police powers to administer breath-tests. After acknowledging that police resources are
insufficient to prosecute every offender the author discusses the prosecution rate required for
effective deterrence. He notes that, ‘The Committee believes that the law is too weak, not
because penalties are wrong, but because they cannot deter when people no longer expect to be
caught’67. French discusses in his memoirs the difficulties caused at Clerkenwell Court when
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different stipendiary magistrates imposed inconsistent sentences. Significantly, he considered
that a fixed sentencing tariff could only be applicable in ‘motoring cases like exceeding the
speed limit and disobeying traffic signs’68. This again highlights his perception as a court clerk
of the essentially regulatory nature of traffic legislation and the distinction between traffic
offences and ‘real’ crime.
42 A number of authors have highlighted how unpopular the use of the criminal law to regulate
motor traffic was with the early owners of motor vehicles. From the beginning of the twentieth
century motorists and motoring organisations argued forcefully that no formal regulation
of motor vehicles was needed since drivers could be trusted to regulate themselves and,
secondly, that any specific form of regulation proposed by central or local government,
such as speed restrictions, was unnecessary, ineffective and an infringement of motorists’
civil liberties. Early twentieth-century motorists were wealthy and politically powerful and
their pressure groups succeeded in influencing the development and application of legislation
both overtly and covertly69. Throughout the twentieth century there were repeated calls for
decriminialisation of motoring offences. These came not only from motoring groups, who
resented being regarded as a ‘criminal class’, but also from magistrates and others within
the court system who agreed with motorists’ views or disliked the boring and routine nature
of traffic work70. By the beginning of the twenty-first century many minor traffic offences,
including speeding and failure to observe a traffic signal, had been decriminalised and are now
dealt with administratively outside the court system by imposition of a fixed penalty. Parking
control is now usually the responsibility of local authorities who find the revenue it provides
a useful supplement to council tax income.
43 Even where it has been decriminalised the regulation of motor traffic remains a highly
contested and emotive issue. Parking control is a contentious topic which regularly features
in local and national newspapers. Motorists continue to resent any form of regulation which
restricts when, where and how they can drive their vehicles or where they can leave them. The
one circumstance in which a road traffic offence is popularly accepted as criminal is when
somebody is killed. As with Mr Eyre’s case at Clerkenwell in 1938, a death in a road traffic
incident still leads to calls for the criminal penalty of imprisonment.
VI
44 The results of this study support Taylor’s argument that during the 1920s and 1930s the police
switched their resources from prosecuting vagrants and drunks to prosecuting motorists in
such a way that the total number of prosecutions remained constant71. At Clerkenwell Court
the average number of cases remained remarkably constant between 1913 and 1963 while
the proportion of road traffic cases increased dramatically and the proportion of minor public
order offences and regulatory offences fell. However, while Taylor presented his argument
entirely from the perspective of the police and was forced to postulate deliberate police
manipulation in order to account for the constant number of prosecutions, this study offers an
alternative insight. The capacity of the magistrates’ courts acted as an additional constraint,
limiting the number of cases which could be prosecuted. It appears that the police viewed
court prosecutions as a fixed resource and chose to use this resource differently at different
periods. This demonstrates that in considering the impact of ‘supply side’ considerations on
prosecution policies it is necessary to consider the resources of local courts as well as the
resources of the police.
45 Once a traffic offence had been brought to court the magistrates exercised considerable
discretion over how they dealt with it. This study has demonstrated that the stipendiary
magistrates at Clerkenwell chose to dismiss a high proportion of the charges for dangerous
driving brought by the police and to accept ‘plea bargain’ admissions of guilt to lesser charges.
Magistrates exercised their discretion to prioritise work which they viewed as important and
to adjourn or dismiss cases they did not view as ‘serious crime’. Different magistrates chose
to handle apparently similar cases differently. The financial penalties imposed at Clerkenwell
Court for serious traffic offences were substantially lower than the national average, which
implies that courts elsewhere must have been imposing fines substantially higher than the
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average. All this evidence shows that the magistrates’ courts were not mechanistic institutions,
handling offences according to set formulae, but highly discretionary and individualistic.
46 This study has demonstrated that national statistics on crime and sentencing provide an
incomplete view of how justice was actually administered. Not only do national averages
conceal substantial local variations in practice, they also mask the crucial impact of decisions
made by individual police officers and individual magistrates. In order to understand the
process of criminal justice it is necessary to examine events at the local level. Even national
policies are administered by individuals, and even dealing with regulatory traffic offences in
the magistrates’ court provided opportunities for magistrates to exercise individual discretion.
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Résumés
 
This article examines the impact of the growing number of prosecutions for road traffic
offences at Clerkenwell Court in central London. The average number of cases heard in
each courtroom remained stationary and additional traffic prosecutions were accommodated
by reductions in prosecutions for drunkenness or disorderly behaviour and for regulatory
offences. This change in police prosecution policy impacted on the court’s proceedings and
increased the court’s workload because motorists were more likely than drunks to argue their
cases and to employ legal representatives. Sentencing patterns, the memoirs of magistrates
and court clerks and other published documents indicate that the court staff viewed traffic
offending as essentially ‘regulatory’ and distinguished it from ‘serious crime’ except when
somebody was killed or a court order was ignored. The court prioritised its own resources
to deal with ‘serious crime’ at the expense of traffic prosecutions. The results of this study
support Howard Taylor’s thesis that resource constraints had an important influence on police
prosecution policies, but show that not only police resources but also court resources and the
discretionary powers of individual magistrates were important factors in prosecution patterns.
 
Cet article examine l’impact du nombre croissant de poursuites concernant la circulation
routière au tribunal de Clerkenwell, au centre de Londres. Le nombre moyen d’affaires
examinées par chaque chambre est resté stationnaire et les affaires supplémentaires de
circulation ont été absorbées grâce à une réduction des poursuites pour ivrognerie, trouble
à l’ordre public, ou à des infractions à la réglementation. Cette modification de la politique
pénale policière a eu pour impact un accroissement de la charge de travail du tribunal parce
que les automobilistes étaient davantage portés que les ivrognes à contester les charges et
à faire appel à un conseil. Les régularités du sentencing, les souvenirs des magistrats et
des greffiers, ainsi que d’autres documents publiés, indiquent que le personnel du tribunal
considérait les infractions de circulation comme une matière essentiellement « réglementaire »
qu’il distinguait des «  infractions graves  », sauf lorsqu’il y avait eu un décès ou qu’une
décision de justice avait été ignorée. Le tribunal donnait la priorité aux « infractions graves »,
au détriment des affaires de circulation. Les résultats de cette étude confirment la thèse
d’Howard Taylor selon laquelle les contraintes qu’imposaient les ressources disponibles
influençaient fortement la politique pénale policière; mais ils montrent que c’est également
vrai des ressources dont disposait le tribunal et des pouvoirs discrétionnaires de chacun des
magistrats, qui influençaient eux aussi en grande partie les décisions de poursuite.
